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Notes
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND DEMAND NOTES
The question propounded for consideration in this article em-
braces primarily the application of the statute of limitations to
the various types of negotiable instruments payable on demand.
Although a superficial examination of the language employed in
such statutes creates an impression that the problem can be cate-
gorically solved in every instance, a more detailed investigation
reveals that in few fields of the law is there greater vacillation
and obscurity.
Concerning the time at which the statute of limitations begins
to run, it is an elementary principle universally adhered to that
the statute is not set in operation until the cause of action has
been perfected.' Although this rule is regarded as fundamental
in all jurisdictions, the chief difficulty is encountered in deter-
mining when a cause of action has accrued. It is this latter troub-
lesome problem that has caused American and English courts to
become quagmired in confusion when applying the statute to
negotiable demand obligations. Realizing that the statute cannot
be set in operation until all conditions precedent to the accrual of
a cause of action have been fulfilled, the courts have strained logic
and reason to the breaking-point in their endeavors to justify a
conclusion that although such notes are expressly proclaimed to
be payable "on demand," yet an actual demand is not necessary in
order to perfect a cause of action. This construction has resulted
in such shallow law that the courts have been forced to pyramid
exceptions in order to harmonize jurisprudence, to some degree,
with existing business and commercial conditions.
IWilliston, Contracts, sec. 2040; 1 Wood, Limitations, sec. 118; Minne-
haha County v. Boyce (1912) 30 S. D. 226, 138 N. W. 287.
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